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Summary 
Creating a favourable investment climate is crucial for economic development. 
Investment increases growth which in turn reduces poverty, at least in the long 
run. The surge in foreign direct investment (FDI) in the 1990s has spurred a 
great number of studies of the determinants of FDI flows. Though the impact 
of FDI on host economies can be substantial, FDI flows total only about one 
sixth of domestic investment in developing countries, which suggests that any 
analysis of investment climates should include domestic investment as well as 
FDI.  
 
In this study, we explore the impact of social development variables on FDI 
and private domestic investment, using panel data from 75 countries for the 
period 1989-2000. Our results show that reducing corruption leads to an 
increase in domestic investment. Though we do not find a significant impact 
of corruption on FDI, previous studies have established a similar relationship 
for FDI. There is thus evidence to suggest that combating corruption can have 
a beneficial effect on both domestic and foreign investment. 
 
Our results indicate that improvements in political rights and civil liberties 
tend to increase FDI. In contrast, political freedom appears to have a negative 
effect on domestic investment. However, other studies suggest that there is a 
positive impact of democratization on corruption, which makes the total effect 
of political freedom on domestic investment ambiguous. 
 
A few other social development variables are found to have an impact on one 
of the two types of investment. Religious tensions appear to be a deterrent of 
FDI, but have no impact on domestic investment. In addition, socio-economic 
conditions could affect domestic investment through savings. 
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1. Domestic investment, foreign direct investment and 
social development 
Creating a sound investment climate is vital for improving the economic 
performance of developing countries. It is a well established empirical 
regularity that economic growth is higher in countries that have higher 
investment rates (Levine and Renelt, 1992). Moreover, economic growth has 
been shown to reduce poverty, at least in the long run (Dollar and Kraay, 
2002). Generating investment is thus an important factor in reducing poverty 
in developing countries, which underscores the need for identifying the key 
characteristics of a favourable investment climate. One aspect of this is the 
institutional environment, in fact the World Bank (2003a) suggests that: 
“Institutions are crucial to fostering a sound investment climate” (p. 136). For 
a more detailed understanding of the impact of institutions on investment, 
however, we need to ask which particular institutions are conducive to 
investment. 
 
The surge in foreign direct investment (FDI) in the 1990s has motivated a host 
of recent studies of the determinants of foreign investment flows. The 
attention awarded FDI is a bit extreme, given the fact that FDI flows to 
developing countries total about $160 billion, whereas domestic investment 
(public and private) in developing countries is at $1 trillion (World Bank, 
2003b, p. xiv). As revealed by figure 1, even after the recent surge in FDI 
flows, FDI constitutes only 3-4% of GDP in developing countries, whereas 
private investment in these countries comprises about 14-15% of GDP. The 
fact that domestic investment is a larger source of finance than FDI does not, 
however, imply that FDI flows are unimportant. To the extent that FDI entails 
a transfer of technological, managerial and organizational skills, or provides 
access to other resources unavailable to developing countries, FDI can have a 
marked impact on productivity and growth. Nevertheless, the sheer bulk of 
domestic investment suggests that in implementing policies to improve the 
investment climate, one should take both domestic and foreign investment into 
account.  
 
In considering FDI flows and domestic investment jointly, a key question is 
whether the two are governed by the same determinants, or whether what 
attracts FDI has no effect on or decreases domestic investment, and vice versa.  
Foreign and domestic investors can be expected to be similarly motivated, 
both want the highest possible return for the least amount of risk. However, 
the two types of investors are different in many ways, they can for instance 
have different alternative investment opportunities, different perceptions of the 
risk of ventures in the host country, and face a different set of regulations in 
their home economies.  
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Figure 1: Trends in private investment and foreign direct investment, 1970-
2000 
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Sources: Everhart and Sumlinski (2001), www.unctad.org. 
 
 
The World Bank (2003c) seems to suggest that the determinants of FDI and 
domestic investment overlap substantially: “A healthy operating environment 
for the corporate sector – including a sound domestic institutional framework 
– is a necessary condition for … the attraction of FDI. It is also required to 
promote … investment for firms and farms” (p. 2). Ghura and Goodwin 
(2000) implicitly argue the opposite: “given the limited role played by foreign 
direct investment in [a number of developing countries], more of the resource 
needed to finance investment in these countries will need to be generated 
domestically. Accordingly, domestic policies will need to be directed at 
establishing an environment conducive to the development of the domestic 
private sector” (p.1820). 
 
In this study, we perform an econometric analysis of the determinants of FDI 
and private domestic investment. To our knowledge, this is the first systematic 
study that provides comparable results on the two types of investment. Our 
focus is on institutional determinants, in a broad sense that captures both 
formal and informal institutions. In particular, the emphasis is on social 
development variables. Social development can be defined as “development 
that is equitable, socially inclusive and therefore sustainable. It promotes local, 
national and global institutions that are responsive, accountable and inclusive 
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and it empowers poor and vulnerable people to participate effectively in 
development processes”. 1  Three dimensions are particularly important: 2 
 
· Empowerment: Giving poor people voice and choice  
· Inclusion: Making institutions more inclusive of poor people's needs and 
aspirations and more effective in delivering services to them  
· Security: Enhancing social stability and human security 
 
In operationalizing these concepts, we use indices of socio-political conditions 
assessed at the country level. Previous empirical studies of investment have 
included indices of socio-political instability, institutional quality, and political 
freedom and democracy, as explanatory variables. The basic theoretical 
rationale of these studies is that socio-political instability, in the form of social 
unrest or government upheaval, increases perceived investment risks. 
Institutional quality, such as the quality and corruptibility of the bureaucracy, 
affects the costs and/or risks of doing business in the country in question. 
Political freedom and democracy might reflect increased stability, and 
property rights might be more secure in countries ruled by impersonal laws 
and institutions. We expand on these previous studies, by estimating the 
impact of variables of this kind on both FDI and private domestic investment. 
 
As a preliminary indication of how social development variables and 
investment might be connected, consider figures 2 and 3. In figure 2, we have 
ranked some 120 developing and industrialized countries, according to their 
FDI inflows in the year 2000. The countries are then divided into ten equally 
large groups, from the 10% of countries with the lowest FDI inflows per 
capita, to the 10% with the highest FDI per capita. FDI inflows increase from 
left to right in the figure. The thin line captures the average score of each 
group of countries on the political risk index of the PRS group, where a higher 
number implies less risk.3 The thick line is the average level of political 
freedom of each group of countries, measured as the average of the political 
rights and civil liberties indices of Freedom House, where a lower number 
signifies more freedom. For the most part, both lines slope upwards, which 
suggests that countries with less political risk and more political freedom, get 
more foreign direct investment. 
 
In figure 3, a similar picture is drawn on the basis of private investment data 
for the year 1998. In this case, 40 developing countries are ranked according 
to their private investment per capita, and divided into ten equally large 
groups. The thin line captures the average score of each group of countries on 
the PRS political risk index. The thick line captures the average score of each 
group of countries on the Freedom House indices. There appears to be an 
upward trend in both cases, suggesting that private investment is higher in 
countries with less political risk and more political freedom. However, the 
                                                 
1 http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/essd/essd.nsf/SocialDevelopment/HOME 
2http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/essd/essd.nsf/e0a6beef25793a39852567f200651c5c/53c960ac
52d3d81a85256934006e5a2c?OpenDocument 
3 PRS = Political Risk Services group 
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lines are far more jagged than in the case of FDI, which makes it harder to 
draw conclusions, however preliminary. 
 
 
Figure 2: FDI per capita and aggregate socio-political indices, 2000 
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Figure 3: Private investment per capita, political risk and freedom, 1998 
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The objective of this study is to provide more substantial evidence on the 
impact of social development on the investment climate of developing 
countries. In what follows, we conduct an econometric analysis of the 
relationship between social development variables, and FDI and private 
investment. The study is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the 
results of previous studies of FDI, that have included socio -political indices as 
explanatory variables. In section 3, we estimate the impact of social 
development variables on FDI, using a data set consisting of 75 countries for 
the period 1989-2000. Section 4 provides a summary of previous studies of 
domestic investment, that incorporate socio-political variables. And in section 
5, we estimate the effect of social development variables on private domestic 
investment, using the same country sample as in section 3. The results from 
sections 3 and 5 provide a basis on which to compare the determinants of FDI 
and private domestic investment. Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Previous studies of FDI and social development 
The body of econometric research on the determinants of foreign direct 
investment is large and diverse. This section reviews available econometric 
studies of FDI that include social development indices as explanatory 
variables. The relevant studies are assigned to three different categories, 
according to the social development indices used.  
 
The first category of studies explores the relation between FDI and socio -
political instability and institutional quality. The reason for placing instability 
and institutional quality in the same category, is that several studies use 
composite indices that capture both these aspects of social development. Other 
studies employ more disaggregate indices of instability, such as the frequency 
of revolutions, assassinations, and internal conflict, and of institutional 
quality, such as the level of corruption and the rule of law. 
 
The second category of studies relates FDI to indices of political freedom or 
democracy. Most of these studies use the Freedom House indices of political 
rights and civil liberties as explanatory variables. In addition, there are studies 
of the impact of democracy and democratic accountability. 
 
A third category consists of studies of labour relations and FDI. Typical 
indices of labour standards and relations capture the degree of unionization, 
the nature of bargaining, gender inequality in employment, and child labour. 
 
There is a great deal of variation in the dependent variable used in 
econometric studies of FDI. Most studies use FDI flows, but some use FDI 
stocks. Some studies use FDI in absolute terms, whereas others use FDI as a 
share of GDP, FDI per capita, or FDI as a share of global FDI. The below 
review of studies indicates that these differences, coupled with variations in 
country samples and time periods, influence the results. The studies reviewed 
below include both developed and developing countries in their sample, unless 
otherwise noted. Results that have been found to be significant at the 5% level 
in the below studies, are reported as significant here. 
Socio-political instability, institutional quality and FDI 
The econometric studies of socio-political instability, institutional quality and 
FDI, can be divided into two sets of studies. One set uses composite indices of 
instability and institutional quality, aggregated from a larger set of individual 
indices capturing narrower phenomena. The other set estimates the relation 
between individual indices and FDI. A commonly cited reason for using 
composite indices, is that there are measurement errors in the narrower indices 
(Svensson, 1998). Studies relating composite indices to FDI flows, tell us 
whether there is a general association between instability and institutional 
quality and FDI, but they do not identify the precise mechanism through 
which the two are connected. In a sense, studies using individual indices 
complement those using composite indices, by providing a more detailed view 
of the relationship between instability and institutional quality and FDI. 
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Below, we start by reviewing studies using composite indices, before turning to 
studies using individual indices. 
 
Kaufmann et al (1999a,b) compile six indices of governance, capturing the 
rule of law, political instability and violence, regulatory burden, government 
effectiveness, graft and corruption, and voice and accountability. Globerman 
and Shapiro (2002) aggregate these six indices into a single governance index. 
Using data from 114/144 countries 1995-97, they find a significantly positive 
impact of governance on FDI flows. The sub-index of regulatory burden is 
also a significant predictor of FDI. These results hold both for the full sample 
of countries, and for the sub-sample of developing and transition economies. 
The interaction of the governance indicator and GDP has a significantly 
negative coefficient, suggesting that the returns from governance in terms of 
foreign investment are diminishing. 
 
Harms and Ursprung (2002) test the impact of two composite indices on FDI 
inflows per capita, for a sample of 62 developing and transition economies 
1989-97. An index of political risk, consisting of three ICRG indices 
(expropriation, repudiation, exchange controls), is found to be insignificant.4 
A similar result is found for an index of the institutional environment, which 
is an aggregate of three other ICRG indices (corruption, bureaucratic quality, 
and law and order). In a separate study by Harms (2002), however, the same 
index of political risk is found to be significantly positive, and with a higher 
coefficient for low-income than for middle-income countries, implying that 
poorer countries have more to gain from reducing political risk. 
 
For a sample of 44 countries over the years 1983-90, Biswas (2002) finds an 
aggregate index based on five ICRG indices (expropriation, repudiation, 
corruption, bureaucratic quality, and law and order) to have a positive effect 
on US capital expenditure as a share of GDP.  
 
Singh and Jun (1995) employ a data set from 31 countries, 1970-93, and find 
a significantly positive relationship between the BERI political risk index and 
FDI flows to GDP. On the BERI index, higher numbers imply less risk, and 
the index is a composite of six elements; fractionalization of the political 
spectrum, linguistic, ethnic and religious fractionalization, dependence on 
and/or importance to a hostile power, and demonstrations/street violence.  
 
Habib and Zurawicki (2002) use data on FDI inflows for 89 countries, 1996-
98. Though basically a study of corruption, the PRS group’s aggregate index 
of political risk is included as an explanatory variable, and stability is found to 
significantly increase FDI flows. The index of political risk captures a range of 
elements reflecting both socio-political instability and institutional quality. 
 
Most studies using composite indices of socio-political instability and 
institutional quality, thus report a significant association with foreign 
investment. Though the results are not unequivocally in favour of there being 
a connection, these studies at least indicate that there is cause for examining 
                                                 
4 ICRG = International Country Risk Guide 
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more closely the precise link between instability and institutional quality, and 
FDI. We turn now to studies that through the use of disaggregate indices, 
provide more information on this link. 
 
Kolstad and Tøndel (2002) test the impact of a range of social development 
variables on FDI inflows per capita, for a sample of 61 developing countries, 
1989-2000. The results from this study indicate that religious tensions, ethnic 
tensions and internal conflict significantly reduce foreign investment. On the 
other hand, indices of external conflict, law and order, government stability, 
military involvement in politics, socio -economic conditions, corruption,  and 
bureaucratic quality, all prove insignificant. 
 
A study by Tuman and Emmert (1999) confirms that internal conflict can be 
important for FDI. This study examines Japanese FDI flows into twelve Latin 
American countries, for the period 1979-92. Their results show a negative 
effect of annual deaths caused by revolutionary movements, and of the 
Falklands war regime transition. Two additional political instability variables, 
coups d’état and attacks against rebel forces in neighbouring countries, prove 
insignificant. 
 
However, Asiedu (2002) gets somewhat different results for a sample of 71 
developing countries, 1988-97. According to her results, the number of 
assassinations and revolutions have no significant impact on FDI inflows as a 
share of GDP. Similarly, in a study of US plant and equipment spending in 
three Latin American countries, Stevens (2000) finds deaths in domestic 
violence and military disturbances insignificant, as are the legality of a 
government and the way in which it came to power. 
 
Two more studies analyze different aspects of government. Jensen (2002) uses 
an index of state capture by local elites, constructed from a 1999 survey of 
firms conducted by the World Bank. Data from 18 transition economies 1993-
1997 reveal that state capture has a negative impact on foreign investment, 
measured as a share of GDP. Biswas (2002) finds an index reflecting regime 
duration to be negatively associated with FDI.  
 
On the subject of institutional quality, Oliva and Rivera-Batiz (2002) find a 
positive relationship between FDI/GDP and the rule of law index due to 
Kaufmann (1999a,b), using data from 119 countries over the period 1970-94. 
 
Two final studies address the matter of corruption and FDI. Wei (2000) 
employs data from the 1990s for 45 countries, and finds corruption to have a 
negative impact on FDI. Wei proves that this result holds for three different 
corruption indices, taken from Business International, ICRG, and 
Transparency International. The impact of corruption are found to be 
economically sizeable, “an increase in the corruption level from that of 
Singapore to that of Mexico would have the same negative effect on inward 
FDI as raising the tax rate by fifty percentage points” (p. 1). 
 
Habib and Zurawicki (2002) expand on the results of Wei (2000), by 
including the absolute difference in corruption between the home and host 
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countries. Their results indicate that while host country corruption decreases 
FDI, a greater absolute difference in corruption levels between home and host 
economies also decreases FDI flows.  
 
The studies using individual indices of socio-political instability and 
institutional quality, thus do provide additional information about the precise 
links between these variables and FDI. Among the institutional quality 
variables tested, there is a strong case for the idea that corruption deters 
foreign investment. The evidence on other institutional variables is, however, 
less conclusive. Of the institutional variables, some studies do indicate that 
internal conflicts and tensions reduce FDI, but the evidence is not unanimous 
on this point. 
Democracy, political freedom and FDI 
The results on political freedom and FDI, seem to differ according to the 
specification of the dependent variable. Studies using FDI as a share of GDP, 
seem to find an insignificant relationship. Notably, Singh and Jun (1995) find 
no significant impact of the Freedom House political rights index on 
FDI/GDP. And in a study using data for 36 developing countries covering the 
period 1980-94, Noorbakhsh et al (2001) report no significant impact on 
FDI/GDP of either of the two Freedom House indices, nor of their average. In 
addition, Kucera (2002) uses FDI inflows as a share of world FDI inflows as a 
dependent variable, and finds political rights insignificant, while civil liberties 
either increase FDI or are insignificant. 
 
In studies that use FDI per capita as a dependent variable, however, political 
freedom appears significant. Harms and Ursprung (2002) find that political 
rights and civil liberties as measured by the Freedom House indices increase 
FDI/capita. Similarly, Kolstad and Tøndel (2002) show the impact of political 
rights and civil liberties to be quite robust to changes in the socio-political 
variables included in the estimated equation. 
 
A few studies use indices of democracy as an explanatory variable of FDI. 
Biswas (2002) sees a significantly positive impact of democracy on US capital 
expenditure as a share of GDP. The democracy variable used in this study is a 
dummy variable taken from the Centre for Institutional Reforms and the 
Informal Sector. Similarly, Kolstad and Tøndel (2002) find a positive 
association between democratic accountability and FDI per capita. The 
employed index of democratic accountability, compiled by the ICRG, reflects 
the degree to which elections are free and fair, and the responsiveness of an 
elected government to its electorate. 
Labour standards and FDI 
A final set of studies test the impact of labour standards or relations on FDI. 
Kucera (2002) conducts an extensive study using a sample of up to 127 
countries, 1993-97, with FDI as a share of global FDI as his dependent 
variable. He finds variables capturing freedom of association and collective 
bargaining to be insignificant, as are indices reflecting the use of child labour. 
However, a higher degree of female representation in administrative and 
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managerial positions appears to attract FDI, whereas female representation in 
other occupations has no effect. Interestingly, the results also indicate that a 
higher literacy rate or degree of educational attainment in women relative to 
men increases the share of FDI received by a country.  
 
In a study using data on US FDI stocks as of 1989 in 19 OECD member 
countries, Cooke (1997) finds stocks to be lower in countries with a higher 
degree of unionization, restrictive layoff regulations and extension of wage 
agreements to non-union members. On the other hand, decentralized wage 
bargaining and compulsory work councils appear to be associated with higher 
FDI stocks. Finally, Singh and Jun (1995) find a significantly negative relation 
between the number of workdays lost and FDI inflows as a share of GDP. The 
differences in the design of the studies incorporating labour standard 
variables, makes it hard to draw general conclusions on the basis of their 
various results. 
Summary  
Previous studies of FDI determinants indicate that there is a relationship 
between broad indices of socio-political instability and institutional quality, 
and FDI. Available evidence points in particular to corruption, and internal 
conflicts, as deterrents of FDI. Political freedom has a significant relation to 
FDI, depending on the dependent variable used. Some studies also indicate a 
positive effect of democratization on FDI inflows. The relationships detected 
in previous studies form the basis of our econometric analysis of FDI flows, 
the results of which are presented in the next section. In particular, we focus 
on the impact of corruption, political freedom and certain aspects of internal 
conflict. Though previous studies have shown an impact of labour standards 
on FDI, we do not pursue variables of this kind further, due to data 
availability. 
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3. An econometric analysis of social development and 
FDI 
We conducted an econometric study of the impact of social development 
variables on FDI flows, based on panel data for up to 75 countries over the 
period 1989-2000. 5 The dependent variable is FDI per capita. Harms (2002) 
suggests that correcting FDI for population size is a more reasonable approach 
than dividing FDI by GDP, since GDP depends on the independent variables. 
Based on previous studies of FDI, we include four control variables and a time 
trend. The four control variables are: GDP per capita (logged), trade as a 
percentage of GDP, inflation (logged), and GDP growth. Attempts to include 
an infrastructure variable, proved it to be insignificant, and it is therefore 
omitted in subsequent analysis. 
 
As indicators of various aspects of social development, we included 13 of the 
indices used in Kolstad and Tøndel (2002). Of these indices, 11 are from the 
ICRG, and capture a whole range of different socio-political conditions, 
whereas the last two are the Freedom House indices of political rights and civil 
liberties. Not all of these variables have a robust relationship to FDI, in the 
sense of being statistically significant for a large set of alternative 
specifications. In the following discussion of our results, we focus on two 
variables that do exhibit a relationship to FDI; the average of the Freedom 
House indices (which we will refer to as political freedom), and the ICRG 
index of religious tension. 
 
In addition, to compare our results on FDI to those on domestic investment 
(section 5), we include the ICRG corruption index, and also the interaction 
term between the corruption index and the Freedom House average. The main 
variables used in the estimation of FDI determinants, are summarized in table 
1. Note that on the ICRG indices, a higher number means more favourable 
conditions (i.e. less corruption, less religious tension), whereas on the Freedom 
House indices, a lower number implies more political freedom. 
 
 
                                                 
5 A list of the country sample is included in the appendix, as are correlation matrices and 
descriptive statistics for the main variables. Due to data availability, some of the below 
regressions report fewer countries. 
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Table 1: Variables used in FDI regressions 
 
VARIABLE SOURCE 
Dependent variable 
Foreign direct investment per capita (logged) UNCTAD 
 
Independent variables: Control variables 
Gross domestic product per capita (logged) World Bank 6 
Trade (Imports + exports) as % of GDP World Bank  
Inflation (logged) World Bank 
GDP growth World Bank 
  
Independent variables: Social development indicators 
Political rights and civil liberties (averaged) Freedom House 
Corruption PRS group ICRG 
Corruption*(political rights/civil liberties)  
Religious tensions PRS group ICRG 
 
 
We ran regressions with social development indicators added individually to 
the control variables, and in various combinations. The basic results are 
summarized in table 2. Column 1 is the baseline specification which includes 
only the control variables. These are all significant at the 1% level. In column 
2, the political freedom index is added to the control variables, and proves 
significant at the 1% level. This result is robust to changes in the independent 
variables included. There is thus a strong correlation between political 
freedom and FDI. 
 
The results in table 2 do not, however, establish a causal relationship from 
political freedom to FDI. Political freedom might attract FDI, but it is also 
possible that a society that gets more FDI, is at a higher level of development 
ant therefore in a better position to implement political reform. In order to 
investigate possible causal relationships, we include lagged values of the 
political freedom variable. We used four different lagged values of political 
freedom, ranging from the previous year’s value to the value observed four 
years earlier, and entered them separately into the regression equations.7 
Adding the lagged variables to the base specification gives quite interesting 
results. All significant results confirm the negative relationship between 
changes in political freedom and changes in FDI flows indicated in table 2. 
 
                                                 
6 http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/GDNdata.htm 
7 Lagged values are highly correlated with each other and including more than one, or 
combining them with the present value, can cause severe problems of multicollinearity 
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Table 2: Regression results random effects estimation. Dependent variable: 
FDI per capita (logged) 
Independent variable  
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
Log GDP per cap. 1.065* 
(0.111) 
0.975* 
(0.112) 
1.026* 
(0.122) 
0.960* 
(0.119) 
0.886* 
(0.119) 
Trade (% of GDP) 0.014* 
(0.0030) 
0.012* 
(0.0030) 
0.013* 
(0.0032) 
0.011* 
(0.0031) 
0.011* 
(0.0031) 
Year 0.117* 
(0.014) 
0.115* 
(0.014) 
0.126* 
(0.015) 
0.123* 
(0.015) 
0.111* 
(0.015) 
Log inflation -0.103* 
(0.037) 
-0.138* 
(0.037) 
-0.107* 
(0.039) 
-0.138* 
(0.038) 
-0.140* 
(0.037) 
GDP growth 0.029* 
(0.009) 
0.027* 
(0.009) 
0.031* 
(0.009) 
0.029* 
(0.009) 
0.031* 
(0.009) 
Political rights & civil liberties  -0.201* 
(0.042) 
 -0.175 
(0.116) 
-0.217* 
(0.043) 
Religious tensions     0.163* 
(0.060) 
Corruption   
 
-0.030 
(0.060) 
0.001 
(0.147) 
 
Corruption*Rights&Liberties    0.011 
(0.034) 
 
Constant -6.53 
(0.80) 
-4.88* 
(0.86) 
-6.07* 
(0.89) 
-4.67* 
(0.99) 
-4.78* 
(0.90) 
R2  
Within 
Between  
Overall 
 
0.38 
0.65 
0.59 
 
0.41 
0.65 
0.60 
 
0.42 
0.72 
0.61 
 
0.44 
0.64 
0.60 
 
0.44 
0.66 
0.62 
# obs. 
# groups 
549 
70 
549 
70 
495 
60 
495 
60 
495 
60 
* indicates significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level 
 
If we apply OLS estimation, we find that only the second-year lag is significant 
(5 %). However, when controlling for country specific characteristics, we get 
significant relationships for the 2, 3 and 4-year lags in both random and fixed 
effect estimation. Both the 2-year and 4-year lags are significant at the 1 % 
level in the two panel approaches, while the 3-year lag is significant at the 5 % 
in the random effect estimation and at the 10 % in the fixed effect estimation. 
There is thus a case for the idea that political freedom attracts FDI. 
 
The corruption index, however, is not significant, as suggested by column 3, 
table 2. Including the interaction term between corruption and political 
freedom, as in column 4, renders the political freedom variable insignificant, 
as are corruption and the interaction term. Note, however, that the correlation 
between the political freedom and the interaction term is quite high (0.74). 
Moreover, auxiliary regressions yield an R2 as high as 0.93, which indicates 
that multicollinearity may be a problem when political freedom, corruption 
and the interaction between these two variables are included simultaneously. 
Testing these three variables in different specifications reveals that political 
freedom is always significant, except for the situation where it is entered 
together with the interaction term. Similar exercises reveal that corruption is 
never significant. Taken together, these results indicate that political freedom 
is significant while corruption is not significant, and that there is not enough 
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information in the data to reveal whether there is a separate effect of the 
interaction between these two variables.  
 
In order to test for possible causal effects of corruption, we included lagged 
values of corruption in the FDI regressions, ranging from the previous year to 
the value four years earlier. We entered the lagged values separately and 
without the present value of corruption, for reasons mentioned above. The 
results were compelling in that lagged values of corruption are insignificant in 
all plausible specifications in OLS regressions, in fixed effects estimation and 
in random effects estimation.  
 
We also find that the index of religious tensions is significant (column 5).  
Inquiring into possible causal relationship, we note that OLS estimation with 
lagged variables proves earlier values of religious tensions to be significant 
indicators of contemporary FDI flows. However, after controlling for country 
specific characteristics, we find that only the 1-year lag is significant (5 %) in 
the random effects estimation and only the 4-year lag is significant in the fixed 
effect estimation. Though the evidence does not unequivocally establish a 
causal relationship where increased religious tensions within a country reduce 
inflows of FDI, we cannot rule out that such a relationship exists. 
 
In sum, the above results show that political freedom is a significant attractor 
of FDI flows. Similarly, religious tensions appear to reduce foreign investment. 
These results in part confirm those of previous studies. In particular, the main 
results of Kolstad and Tøndel (2002) prove to be fairly robust to the inclusion 
of a wider set of control variables, and also to the inclusion of lagged 
variables. The political freedom and religious tension variables also prove 
economically significant, in the sense that a one-category improvement on 
either index, has an impact on FDI flows that is comparable to an increase in 
trade/GDP by 14-20 percentage points. However, we find no evidence of a 
relationship between corruption and FDI, which is contrary to the results of 
previous studies. 
 
The significance of political freedom and religious tensions suggests that 
foreign investors are drawn to more politically stable countries. However, the 
impact of political freedom might also reflect a perception that countries 
governed by impersonal institutions, have more secure property rights. A 
further possibility is that since the greater part of FDI flows originates in 
democracies, investors are attracted to countries with a similar and familiar 
type of regime.  
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4. Previous studies of domestic investment and social 
development 
There is a large literature on the determinants of domestic investment. As 
investment is a robust determinant of growth, important results are also found 
in the growth literature. In this section, we review the available econometric 
studies of investment that include social development indices as explanatory 
variables. The relevant studies can be split into three broad categories, 
according to the social development indices used. The first two categories 
match those used in the review of the FDI literature. 
 
The first category consists of studies focusing on socio-political instability and 
institutional quality. Typical instability indices used are the frequency of 
revolutions, coups, assassinations, constitutional changes and so on. 
Institutional quality indices capture bureaucratic quality, corruption, the rule 
of law and other similar institutional features. 
 
A second category of studies, explores the relationship between investment 
and political freedom or democracy. These studies typically use the Freedom 
House indices of political rights and civil liberties as explanatory variables, or 
indices of the level of democracy. 
 
The third category consists chiefly of a single influential study of the impact of 
social capital on investment. The study in question, Knack and Keefer (1997), 
relates investment to measures of trust and norms of civic-minded behaviour. 
 
Below, the three categories of studies are reviewed in turn. Note that we 
restrict ourselves to including recent econometric studies. The dependent 
variable used in the reviewed studies is total domestic investment, i.e. private 
plus public investment, except where explicitly noted. All the below studies 
use investment as a percentage of GDP as their dependent variable. The 
country samples include both developed and developing countries, except 
where noted. For reasons of consistency, we report as significant results that 
have been found to be significant at the 5% level in the studies reviewed. 
Socio-political instability, institutional quality and investment 
Most studies relating socio-political and institutional indices to investment, 
attempt to estimate a direct impact of an index or a set of indices on 
investment. We start by summarizing the results of these studies. There are, 
however, more elaborate studies that explore the interrelationship between 
socio-political and institutional variables, arguing that there is some chain of 
events in which one of these variables influences another, which in turn has an 
impact on investment. We return to these more complex studies shortly. 
 
Brunetti and Weder (1998) conduct a study in which various indices of 
institutional uncertainty are added individually to a basic specification seeking 
to explain average investment rates for 60 countries, 1974-89.  Leaving aside 
the indices of macroeconomic volatility, the remaining indices capture various 
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forms of socio-political instability or uncertainty. Three variables are found to 
be significant: The number of revolutions, the number of political executions 
and the number of war casualties on domestic territory. For all three, a one 
standard deviation increase in instability, decreases investment to GDP by 1.5-
1.8 percentage points. The remaining indices found to be insignificant are: 
Coups, political demonstrations, probability of opposition takeover, 
assassinations, strikes, riots, armed attacks, deaths in political violence, violent 
social change, probability of terrorism, constitutional changes, changes in the 
institutional framework, unreliability of the judiciary, bureaucratic quality, 
corruption, and the rule of law. 
 
Bohn and Deacon (2000) do a similar study with fewer political variables, 
using data from 125 countries for the period 1955-88.  Their results confirm 
the negative impact of revolutions on investment. In addition, they find 
investment to be significantly higher in parliamentary democracies than in 
other regimes. Major constitutional changes are found to have a significant 
impact on investment, depending on the regime type. Constitutional changes 
that produce a less democratic regime, or that leave the regime unchanged, 
have a negative impact on investment. Constitutional changes that produce a 
more democratic regime, have a positive impact. Moreover, a positive impact 
of political purges on investment is found, which Bohn and Deacon relate to 
the higher incidence of purges in Latin American countries, than in African 
countries. Finally, two indices of political assassinations and guerrilla warfare, 
are found to be insignificant. 
 
Servén (1997) considers the impact of a range of political instability variables 
on private investment, using panel data from 86 developing countries for the 
years 1970-90. A dummy variable for wars (civil and international) is found to 
be negative and significant. However, indices measuring assassinations, coups 
d’état, constitutional changes, cabinet changes, government crises, riots, and 
revolutions, all prove insignificant. 
 
A number of studies explore the impact of a more limited set of variables on 
investment. Barro (1991) finds measures of revolutions and political 
assassinations to be significantly related to investment. The relationship 
between revolutions and investment also holds up relatively well in the 
robustness study of Levine and Renelt (1992). Knack and Keefer (1995) find a 
significant relation between property rights enforcement (measured as risk of 
expropriation and repudiation of contracts) and investment. Mauro (1995) 
sees a negative impact of corruption on investment. Campos et al (1999) find 
a negative association between corruption and investment, but corruption is 
less damaging the more predictable it is. Ayal and Karras (1996) indicate a 
significantly negative association between bureaucratic inefficiency and 
investment. However, as Ayal and Karras do not include any control variables 
in their investment regression, it is impossible to tell how robust their result is 
to changes in the specification. 
 
Summarizing the studies that attempt to find a direct relationship between 
investment and indices of socio-political instability and institutional quality, 
some variables seem particularly important. Of the instability indices, the 
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frequency of revolutions is related to investment by most, but not all, studies 
where it is included. Similarly, wars seem to affect investment. Major 
constitutional changes might have an impact on investment, when controlling 
for regime type. One study finds a negative impact of political executions. 
Among the institutional indices, one study finds property rights to matter for 
investment. Corruption appears to reduce investment, but this result is not 
confirmed by all studies that include corruption as an explanatory variable. 
 
The above studies take a simple approach to estimating the relationship 
between investment and instability and institutional variables. We turn now to 
studies that take a more complex perspective, by exploring how instability and 
institutional variables affect each other, and then in turn affect investment. 
Studies of this kind are important in identifying the precise mechanisms 
through which instability and institutional variables are related to investment. 
 
Alesina and Perotti (1996) argue that “income inequality, by fuelling social 
discontent, increases socio-political instability. The latter… reduces 
investment” (p. 1203). Three mechanisms connecting political instability and 
investment are suggested: Firstly, short-lived governments have greater 
incentives to tax factors that can be accumulated. Secondly, social unrest can 
cause disruptions in productive activities. Thirdly, socio-political instability 
increases uncertainty. In particular, uncertainty in terms of property rights is 
seen as important. 
 
Testing their hypotheses using cross-sectional data from 71 countries for the 
period 1960-85, Alesina and Perotti (1996) find them to be largely supported. 
An index of social unrest and political violence has a significantly negative 
impact on domestic investment. Furthermore, income equality, measured by 
the income share of the middle class, has a negative effect on political stability. 
The effects from inequality to instability, and from instability to investment 
are also economically significant. A one standard deviation increase in the 
income share of the middle class is associated with a decrease in the political 
instability index by half a standard variation, which in turn increases the share 
of investment in GDP by almost 3%. 
 
Svensson (1998) studies a political economy model of domestic investment, in 
which a government invests in a legal system, which in turn affects private 
investment. He shows that in a context of unstable and polarized political 
systems, governments might not have an incentive to invest in reforming the 
legal system, resulting in weak property rights and low domestic investment 
rates. There are two basic reasons why a government does not invest in legal 
infrastructure in this case. Firstly, an incumbent government carries the costs 
of reform, but not the future benefits. Secondly, weak property rights leads to 
less taxable activity, which reduces the tax base for any future government 
that does not share the objectives of the incumbent. 
 
Svensson (1998) tests the implications of the model, using cross-country data 
from 101 countries for the years 1960-1985. Two different proxies for the 
quality of legal institutions, or the protection of property rights, are used. One 
is the aggregate of five ICRG indices; rule of law, corruption in government, 
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bureaucratic quality, expropriation, and repudiation of contracts. The other is 
the aggregate of four BERI indices; bureaucratic delays, nationalization 
potential, contract enforceability and infrastructure quality.8 Political 
instability is measured by estimated indices of government change, and major 
government change (i.e. changes that imply a significant turnover in 
leadership). Political polarization is measured by income inequality, and an 
index of social unrest and political violence.  
 
The empirical tests basically confirm the predictions of the model. The 
property rights indices have statistically significant effects on domestic 
investment. The effects are also economically significant, “a one-standard 
deviation increase in the property rights index is associated with an increase in 
the (private domestic) investment rate by 4.02% of GDP” (Svensson 1998, p. 
1329). Similarly, political instability and polarization have significantly 
negative effects on property rights. A final interesting result is derived by 
including the indices of instability and polarization in the investment equation. 
It turns out that their impact changes from significant to insignificant, as the 
index of property rights is added to the equation. This confirms the idea that 
property rights constitute the transmission mechanism between political 
instability and investment. 
Democracy, political freedom and investment 
Several studies relate investment to measures of democracy and political 
freedom. Among the studies mentioned above, Bohn and Deacon (2000) find 
investment to be significantly higher in parliamentary democracies than in 
other regimes. Servén (1997) finds that in most specifications, civil liberties as 
measured by Barro and Lee (1994), have no significant impact on private 
investment in developing countries. 
 
Pastor and Hilt (1993) test the impact of the level of democracy on private 
investment, employing data from the seven largest Latin American economies 
for the years 1973-86. Using the measure of democracy in Gurr (1990), they 
find it to be positively and significantly related to investment in most 
specifications.  
 
Ghura and Goodwin (2000) test the impact of political rights on private 
investment in developing countries. Using panel data from 31 countries for the 
period 1975-1992, they find that the Freedom House index of political rights 
did not have a significant impact on investment. However, splitting the data 
set according to regions, political rights appear to increase investment in Asia, 
while remaining insignificant in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. 
 
For a sample of 40 developing countries for the years 1970-96, Mlambo and 
Oshikoya (2001) find the Freedom House indices of political rights and civil 
liberties to be insignificant for private investment. Interestingly, however, their 
results show that the interaction term between political rights and civil 
liberties has a significant association with investment. These results thus 
                                                 
8 BERI = Business Environment Risk Intelligence 
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appear to imply that the overall level of political freedom in a country affects 
investment, with more freedom producing more private investment. 
 
Evidence for another type of interactive effects is found in Özler and Rodrik 
(1992). Using data from 32 countries over the 1975-85 period, they find that 
while political rights and civil liberties are usually insignificant when entered 
individually, political rights interacted with the real LIBOR rate are 
consistently significant with a negative coefficient. 9  According to Özler and 
Rodrik, this implies that “the effect of an external shock is larger in countries 
with more restricted political systems”, or, “conversely, that increased 
political liberties dampen the effect of negative shocks” (p. 157). Moreover, 
they estimate that a one standard deviation in the interaction term, decreases 
investment to GDP by 4 percentage points from its sample mean. 
 
In sum, then, democracy appears to have a positive association with 
investment. As argued by Bohn and Deacon (2000), property rights might be 
the mechanism which connects the two, “ownership security tends to be weak 
in countries ruled by individuals and dominant elites, and strong in countries 
ruled by impersonal laws and institutions” (p.535). The question of whether 
there is a link between investment and political rights and civil liberties is a 
more complex one, neither of these variables seems important in and of itself, 
but collectively or interacted with other variables, a relationship with 
investment has been found. 
Social capital and investment 
Knack and Keefer (1997) explore the impact of social capital on investment 
and growth. As manifestations of social capital, they use trust and norms of 
civic-minded behaviour. Trust and civic norms are believed to affect 
investment through four basic mechanisms. Firstly, transaction costs are 
reduced since there is less need to rely on elaborate contracts, formal 
institutions, and expensive monitoring. Secondly, government policies may be 
perceived as more credible. Thirdly, civic norms may resolve collective action 
problems. And fourth, political participation and hence the quality of 
government may be affected. 
 
Measures of trust and civic cooperation are elicited from the World Value 
Surveys, with trust reflecting the percentage in a country that responds that 
most people can be trusted, while civic norms capture the view respondents 
take of claiming benefits for which they are not eligible, avoiding fares on 
public transportation, cheating on taxes, keeping money found, and failing to 
report damage done to other people’s property. In a cross-country regression 
of 29 countries, using average investment data for the period 1982-1990, 
Knack and Keefer find that civic norms significantly increase investment, 
whereas trust is insignificant at the 5% level. The impact of civic norms is 
economically significant, a one-standard deviation in the index increases 
investment to GDP by nearly 2 percentage points. As for the determinants of 
                                                 
9 LIBOR = London Interbank Offering Rate. 
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civic norms, they are enhanced by greater income equality and ethnic 
homogeneity. 
Summary 
Previous studies of the determinants of domestic investment suggest that 
variables reflecting socio-political instability, such as revolutions, wars, and 
constitutional changes, have a significantly negative effect on investment. In 
addition, institutional quality variables in the form of property rights and 
corruption appear to affect investment. Studies exploring more complex 
relationships suggest that there is a link from inequality to instability, from 
instability to the security of property rights, and from property rights to 
investment.  
 
Various indices of democracy seem to be related to domestic investment, 
whereas political freedom does not seem important in itself, but more so when 
interacted with other variables. In the subsequent econometric analysis of 
private domestic investment, we reconsider some of the relationships deemed 
important by previous studies. In particular, we focus on the variables of 
political freedom and corruption, which from the available evidence appear to 
be important for both FDI and domestic investment. Though social capital 
appears to be linked to investment, the data available to us does not permit 
further analysis of this theme. 
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5. An econometric analysis of social development and 
private domestic investment 
The data set used in section 3, also forms the basis for our estimation of the 
impact of social development variables on domestic investment. To keep 
results comparable, we use private domestic investment per capita as our 
dependent variable. This is a departure from previous studies of domestic 
investment, which have all used the ratio of investment to GDP as their 
dependent variable. Nevertheless, given our choice of dependent variable in 
section 3, a similar approach is appropriate here, in order to compare the 
impact of social development variables on FDI to their impact on domestic 
investment. 
 
From the previous literature on domestic investment, we choose to include 
four control variables in our baseline specification: GDP per capita (logged), 
trade as a percentage of GDP, illiteracy, and infrastructure (telephone lines per 
1000 people). The time trend proved insignificant in preliminary estimations, 
and was subsequently dropped. The same 13 social development indices as in 
section 3 were tested as potential determinants of private investment. Relevant 
results were derived for only three of these; the political freedom variable (that 
is, the average of the freedom House political rights and civil liberties indices), 
and the ICRG indices of socio-economic conditions and corruption. Table 3 
reports the main variables used in the estimations of private investment 
determinants. Note once more that a higher score on the ICRG indices implies 
more favourable conditions, whereas a lower score on the Freedom House 
indices implies more political freedom. 
 
Table 3: Variables used in private domestic investment regressions 
VARIABLE SOURCE 
Dependent variable 
Private investment per capita (logged) World Bank 
 
Independent variables: Control variables 
Gross domestic product per capita (logged) World Bank  
Trade (Imports + exports) as % of GDP World Bank  
Illiteracy World Bank 
Infrastructure (phone lines/1000 inhabitants) World Bank 
  
Independent variables: Social development indicators 
Political rights and civil liberties (averaged) Freedom House 
Corruption PRS group ICRG 
Corruption*(political rights/civil liberties)  
Socio-economic conditions PRS group ICRG 
 
 
The basic results of our estimations are summarized in table 4, but we also 
tested a wide range of different econometric specifications, included lagged 
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variables. The methodology is the same as applied in the FDI analysis, so we 
used OLS estimation, random effects estimation and fixed effect regressions to 
investigate whether different models would impact the findings on 
determinants of domestic investment. 
 
In our baseline specification in column 1, infrastructure proves significant at 
the 5% level, and the other three control variables at the 1% level. The sign of 
the infrastructure coefficient is the opposite of what one would expect, but 
this variable becomes insignificant as more explanatory variables are added. 
As shown by the initial regressions in columns 2 and 3, neither political 
freedom nor corruption are significant when added individually to the control 
variables. However, when we include both these variables and their 
interaction term, as in column 4, all three are significant at least at the 5% 
level. A final initial result is given in columns 5 and 6: The index of socio-
economic conditions is significant at the 5% level when added individually to 
the control variables, but loses its significance when the political freedom and 
corruption variables are added to the specification. 
 
 
Table 4: Regression results random effects estimation. Dependent variable: 
Private investment per capita (logged) 
Independent variables  
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
Log GDP per cap. 1.091* 
(0.068) 
1.091* 
(0.053) 
1.121* 
(0.065) 
1.120* 
(0.065) 
1.097* 
(0.066) 
1.096* 
(0.066) 
Trade (% of GDP) 0.004* 
(0.001) 
0.004* 
(0.001) 
0.004* 
(0.001) 
0.004* 
(0.001) 
0.004* 
(0.001) 
0.003* 
(0.001) 
Illiteracy -0.013* 
(0.003) 
-0.013* 
(0.003) 
-0.009* 
(0.003) 
-0.009* 
(0.003) 
-0.009* 
(0.003) 
-0.009* 
(0.003) 
Infrastructure 
 
-0.002** 
(0.0008) 
-0.002** 
(0.0008) 
-0.001 
(0.0008) 
-0.001 
(0.0008) 
-0.001 
(0.0008) 
-0.001 
(0.0008) 
Socio-econ. conditions     0.026** 
(0.013) 
0.025 
(0.012) 
Political rights & civil lib.  -0.020 
(0.018) 
 -0.112* 
(0.050) 
 -0.107** 
(0.045) 
Corruption  
 
 -0.003 
(0.025) 
-0.134** 
(0.059) 
 -0.133** 
(0.059) 
Corruption* 
Rights&Liberties 
   0.032* 
(0.013) 
 0.030** 
(0.013) 
Constant 2.06* 
(0.52) 
2.14* 
(0.52) 
1.77* 
(0.50) 
2.24* 
(0.53) 
1.79* 
(0.49) 
2.28* 
(0.53) 
R2  
Within 
Between  
Overall 
 
0.31 
0.88 
0.84 
 
0.31 
0.88 
0.84 
 
0.37 
0.89 
0.85 
 
0.38 
0.89 
0.85 
 
0.39 
0.89 
0.85 
 
0.38 
0.89 
0.85 
# obs. 
# groups 
486 
71 
486 
71 
429 
61 
429 
61 
429 
61 
429 
61 
 
* indicates significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level 
 
The initial result that political freedom and corruption are significant when 
added jointly with their interaction term would suggest a quite complex 
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interplay between political freedom and corruption in influencing private 
investment. The coefficient of political freedom is negative, the coefficient of 
the corruption index negative, and the coefficient of the interaction terms 
positive. This implies that the impact of improved political freedom on 
investment may depend on the relative sizes of two different terms. On the one 
hand, improved political freedom increases investment through its individual 
term, but decreases investment through the interaction term. And which term 
is greater, depends on the level of corruption. If the level of corruption is high 
(low score on the ICRG index), the individual term is greater, and increased 
political freedom increases private investment. If the level of corruption is low, 
the interaction term is greater, and political freedom decreases private 
investment. 
 
However, we need to inquire deeper into this result. The first issue is that we 
would like to assess whether there is a causal relationship between changes in 
corruption and political freedom and changes in investment. Thus, we include 
lagged values of corruption, political freedom and the interaction term 
(between corruption and political freedom) in order to investigate whether 
changes at one point in time would influence private investment at a later 
stage. Starting with the base specification in column 1, we entered different 
lagged values of political freedom and corruption, both separately and 
together.10 To investigate whether our results are sustained when pooling all 
observations and looking at the correlation between levels, we started out by 
applying OLS estimation. Then, in order to control for country specific fixed 
effects, we used the random effect estimation and the fixed effect estimation to 
investigate whether or not changes between and within countries over time 
would influence investment.  
 
The OLS results are clear on the sign and significance of corruption, and on 
the lagged values of corruption. We get a negative coefficient in all of these 
regressions, and all the lagged values from 1-year lags to 4-year lags are 
negative and significant, ranging from the 1 % to the 10 % significance level. 
This result does not depend on the specification in that we get the same result 
if corruption is entered in the base specification, or together with political 
freedom, or together with political freedom and the interaction term. The 
economic interpretation of this result is that higher levels of corruption today 
may increase investment in the years to come, but it is necessary to control for 
country specific patterns before we draw any conclusions. 
 
The random effects and fixed effect estimations do in fact indicate that the 
above results of a causal relationship between corruption and investment may 
arise from the fact that OLS does not control for country specific effects. 
Using the panel dimension indicates that there is less correlation between 
changes in corruption and investment within a country over time, but also 
between countries over time. All of the random and fixed effect results (except 
one) that were significant indicate that there is an opposite relationship 
                                                 
10 When combining the lagged values, we always used the values that correspond in time. For 
example, the 2-year lag of corruption was entered together with the 2-year lag of rights and 
the 2-year lag of the interaction term.  
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between corruption and investment in comparison to the OLS analysis. Taken 
together, our results thus suggest that increased corruption reduces private 
investment within and between countries. 
 
Our results on political freedom, however, do not allow for as firm 
conclusions as suggested for corruption. Entering political freedom into the 
base specification yields positive and significant coefficients for several lagged 
values, except when we include the interaction term between political freedom 
and corruption. Specifications with all three variables (political freedom, 
corruption and the interaction between these two) change the sign into a 
negative one for the political freedom coefficient, and it is only the 4-year lag 
that is significant in addition to the contemporary value of political freedom. 
However, this 4 -year lag also results in a negative coefficient. 
 
The instability of this variable seems to stem from a similar problem of 
multicollinearity, as detected in the FDI regressions. The correlation between 
the interaction term and political freedom is 0.75, and auxiliary regressions 
yield an R2 as high as 0.93. Moreover, we tested a wide range of different 
econometric specifications that included lagged values of political freedom, 
and all of them yield  positive and significant coefficients.  
 
Taken together, these results suggest that improvements in political rights and 
civil liberties reduce domestic investment. In addition, we are also convinced 
that the significant coefficients from the interaction term (column 6) are 
results of multicollinearity. Thus, there is not enough variation in the data to 
test whether there exists an interaction effect between political freedom and 
corruption on investment. 
 
As for socio-economic conditions, they are significant at the 5% level. The 
result that this variable becomes insignificant when the interaction term of 
political freedom and corruption is added (see column 6) seems to arise from 
the aforementioned multicollinearity. The index of socio-economic conditions 
includes housing, unemployment, medical provision and more. It is likely that 
any effect of these conditions on investment, is due to increased savings in 
societies where socio-economic conditions are more favourable. Having data 
on gross domestic savings, we were able to test this hypothesis. And as it turns 
out, socio-economic conditions are a highly significant predictor of savings.  
 
In sum, the results from our econometric analyses of FDI and domestic 
investment, suggest that social development variables affect the two types of 
investment quite differently. Increased corruption appears to reduce domestic 
investment, while we find little evidence of an effect on FDI. Expanding 
political freedom appears to increase FDI inflows, whereas the effect on 
domestic investment seems to be negative. Religious tensions likely deter FDI, 
but appear to have no impact on domestic investment. Finally, socio-economic 
conditions have no effect on FDI, but might affect domestic investment 
through increased savings. 
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6. Conclusions 
Social development is important in and of itself. Improved rights and liberties, 
socio-political stability and human security, and accountable and responsive 
institutions, signal a society that is more sensitive to the situation of the poor 
and vulnerable. In addition, the question is whether social development has an 
economic payoff, in terms of increased investment, increased growth, and 
reduced poverty. In this study, we have explored the link between social 
development and foreign direct investment and domestic investment, using 
panel data from 75 developing countries for the period 1989-2000. To our 
knowledge, this is the first study to provide comparable results on the 
determinants of FDI and domestic investment. 
 
Our results point to corruption as a major deterrent of domestic investment. 
Though we do not find a significant relationship between corruption and FDI, 
previous studies have demonstrated that a similar relationship might be found 
here. The policy implications of these results are therefore fairly 
straightforward; countries seeking to increase their total level of investment, 
should aim to reduce corruption. 
 
The implications of the results on political freedom are less obvious. In our 
econometric analyses, we find that improvements in political rights and civil 
liberties tend to increase FDI, while reducing domestic investment. On the face 
of it, this implies that the net effect of political liberalization on total 
investment is unclear. However, the results of Treisman (2000) suggest that 
democratization reduces corruption, at least over time. The analytical 
argument for such a relationship is that officials are held accountable for their 
actions in a democracy, through elections, critical scrutiny from the press and 
other interest groups, and an independent judiciary. Though we find that the 
direct effect of political freedom on domestic investment is negative, it is 
therefore possible that there is an additional indirect effect whereby political 
freedom reduces corruption which in turn promotes domestic investment. 
Political freedom might thus have a more positive effect on total investment 
than our results would indicate. 
 
Furthermore, our results suggest that religious tensions appear to be a robust 
deterrent of FDI. We also find some evidence that socio-economic conditions 
affect domestic investment through increased savings. Other results from 
previous studies of domestic investment are not confirmed by our analyses. In 
particular, indices of internal socio -political instability, and institutional 
indices such as bureaucratic quality and the rule of law, exhibit no significant 
effect on domestic investment. 
 
The econometric analyses performed here, identify some general relationships 
between social development variables and FDI and domestic investment. To 
more precisely elicit the mechanisms through which political freedom and 
other variables affect investment, further theoretical and empirical studies are 
needed. One aspect of this is that the use of aggregate investment data, lumps 
together agents who might have very different motivations for investing. By 
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using firm level or industry level data on investment, one might be able to 
provide a more detailed account of investment determinants (cf. Kolstad and 
Villanger, 2003).  
 
Another way to get a more detailed view of the mechanisms connecting 
investment and social development variables, is to use country case studies. In 
light of the results of this study, identifying case countries that can provide 
additional information on the interplay of democratization, corruption and 
foreign and domestic investment, would be of interest. Candidate case 
countries would be countries that have undergone democratization in the not 
too distant past. 
 
Though previous studies find a close association between some social 
development variables and investment in developing countries, we attempt to 
test for causality by using lagged variables. However, this procedure does not 
fully establish whether there is a strict causal link from the former to the 
latter. Possible endogeneities produce additional analytical complications that 
future studies should address. 
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Appendix 
 
Country sample: 
Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cambodia, 
Cameroon, Cap Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, 
Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kenya, Rep. 
Korea, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, 
Mexico, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Panama, Papa New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, 
Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela, 
Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
 
 
Table 5: Correlation matrix 
 
 Lfdi lgdp Trade Year Linflat GDP 
gr 
Infrastr Private 
invest 
Rights 
& Lib. 
Lfdi 1.000         
lgdp 0.702 1.000        
Trade 0.307 0.073 1.000       
year 0.290 0.187 0.091 1.000      
Linflat -0.092 -0.014 -0.227 -0.157 1.000     
GDPgr 0.202 0.117 0.066 0.112 -0.321 1.000    
Infrastr 0.449 0.725 0.075 0.250 0.104 -0.005 1.000   
private
invest 
0.321 0.360 0.375 0.020 -0.148 0.275 0.195 1.000  
Rights 
& Lib. 
-0.423 -0.500 -0.056 -0.061 -0.179 0.019 -0.438 -0.123 1.000 
 
 
An L indicates that the variable is logged. 
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  
      
Year  589  5.646859 3.083461  1  11 
GDP growth  588  3.490685 4.989847  -50.2  18.83 
Trade  587  64.80077 34.95145  13.24  282.40 
Corruption 523  3.082218 .9898572  0  5 
Relig. tens. 523  4.500956 1.285604  1  6 
Socio-econ. 523  5.581262 1.564266  0  11 
Dummy oil 589  .2003396 .4005947  0  1 
Illiteracy 579  28.0421 21.51635  .3  88.4 
lfdi  589  2.385194 1.961534  -4.72  6.49 
lgdp  589  6.971753 1.025491  4.80  9.34 
grdomsav 587  16.04249 12.6123  -59.69  48.48 
Infrastructure 497  57.9163 73.82998  .4  444 
linflat  552  2.553223 1.408683  -2.15  8.92 
Rights and lib. 589  3.827674 1.601317  1  7 
CorrRigh 523  11.18164 5.732753  0  35 
InvestN 589  9.475812 1.388295  4.75  12.78 
 
 
InvestN is  log(gross domestic savings per capita). 
lgdp is log (FDI per capita) 
 
  
Summary 
 
Creating a favourable investment climate is crucial for 
economic development. In this study, we explore the 
impact of social development variables on FDI and private 
domestic investment, using panel data from 75 countries 
for the period 1989-2000. Our results show that reducing 
corruption leads to an increase in domestic investment. 
Though we do not find a significant impact of corruption 
on FDI, previous studies have established a similar 
relationship for FDI. Thus there is evidence to suggest that 
combating corruption can have a beneficial effect on both 
domestic and foreign investment. 
Our results indicate that improvements in political 
rights and civil liberties tend to increase FDI. In contrast, 
political freedom appears to have a negative effect on 
domestic investment. However, other studies suggest that 
democratization has a positive impact on corruption, 
which makes the total effect of political freedom on 
domestic investment ambiguous. 
A few other social development variables are 
found to have an impact on one of the two types of 
investment. Religious tensions appear to deter FDI, but 
have no impact on domestic investment. In addition, socio-
economic conditions could affect domestic investment 
through savings. 
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